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Framing the valuation of ecosystem services: 
a theoretical discussion of the challenges and opportunities associated with 
articulating values that reflect the economic contributions of  ecological 
phenomena 
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This paper presents a theoretical discussion concerning possibilities for designing 
environmental value articulation procedures that respect the basic non-economic 
character of ecological phenomena.  The question of how to estimate the economic 
value of ecosystem services contributions is a particularly important issue for 
agricultural economics because of the dependence of agricultural production on the 
life cycles and biological viability of ecosystems (sic Georgescu-Roegen, 1966).   
Distinguishing between two basic types of ecosystem services values – demand vs 
supply based – this paper aims to describe a theoretical context within which it may 
be possible to develop recommendations regarding procedures and associated 
institutional structures that can support the expression of economically relevant 
measures of the economic worth of a given ecological phenomena that are also 
ecologically sound.  Finally it is proposed that there are strong synergies between the 
problem structure of this issue and the theoretical contributions of Herbert Simon, 




1.  Introduction 
 
This paper presents a theoretical discussion concerning possibilities for designing 
environmental value articulation procedures that respect the basic non-economic 
character of ecological phenomena, including the irreducible uncertainty of their 
stochastic change dynamics, while still producing value estimates that are 
operationally useful for conducting economic analyses.  While the generation of such 
estimates is often viewed as a topic for environmental as opposed to agricultural   2
economics, the question of how to estimate the economic value of ecosystem services 
contributions is a particularly important issue for agricultural economics because of 
the dependence of agricultural production on the life cycles and biological viability of 
ecosystems (sic Georgescu-Roegen, 1966).  Distinguishing between two basic types 
of ecosystem services values – demand vs supply based – this paper aims to describe 
a theoretical context within which it may be possible to develop recommendations 
regarding procedures and associated institutional structures that can support the 
expression of economically relevant measures of the economic worth of a given 
ecological phenomena that are also ecologically sound.    This problematique has, in 
recent years, come to be labelled ‘ecosystem services valuation’ (sic Suhkdev, 2008) 
and we will adopt that term here, for convenience and clarity, while keeping in mind 
that the term ‘services’ presumes an instrumental relationship between economic and 
ecological processes.  
2.  Opening propositions 
We may begin from the presumption that all values must, by definition, relate back to 
some system of human judgement.  Economic values or judgements of worth can then 
be defined as those values that relate back to systems of human judgements that 
structure and regulate economic production and consumption.  Some economic values 
deriving from the services of ecological phenomena are relatively easy to observe and 
estimate.  For example, an annual drop in the productivity of an agricultural field, due 
to deterioration of the soil ecology, as a result of over-irrigation, can be measured in 
terms of reduced productivity or increased fertilisation costs.  A minimum ecosystem 
service value can thus be observed, either as the cost of maintaining production 
steady, under deteriorating conditions, or as lost income.  Such shadow price 
estimates provide more or less plausible base line value estimates of the minimum 
economic worth directly provided an ecosystem’s services.  However there is another 
set of economic values, referred to variously as indirect, non-use, intrinsic or 
existence values, which are considerably more difficult to estimate.  It is these values 
that will occupy our attention in the following pages.   
 
Within this sub-category of indirect values, we can further distinguish between 
demand-based ecosystem services values – which are related to preferences and 
willingness and ability to “pay” and supply based values – which are related to the   3
ecosystems production and willingness and ability to “sell”.
iii  While demand based 
ecosystem services values can be estimated through exclusive reference to the system 
of human judgements that structure and regulate economic production and 
consumption, supply based values must also include reference to a second system of 
human judgements, one that provides understanding regarding how ecosystems 
generate and maintain supplies of the goods and services that are economically useful 
to humans.  It can be expected that lack of reliable data regarding supply-based value 
contributions of ecosystem services leads at the very least to their inefficient use and 
at worst to their systematic over consumption and the eventual collapse of the 
ecosystem. While demand-based values can be estimated by consulting economic 
actors regarding their preferences, estimating supply-based values requires the 
deployment of a complex array of often uncertain information that bridges the 
analytical divide between social and physical sciences. 
3.  The Problem: 
Since the advent of mainstream environmental economics, in the 1970s, efforts to 
develop appropriate methods for articulating the economic worth of what have been 
called here above ‘supply-based” or complex intrinsic values have been ongoing.
iv  
They have usually taken the form of price estimates and have been accompanied by a 
constant critique (Kapp, 1971; Kneese, 1977; Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Costanza 
1998), with it being generally agreed that efforts to reduce such economic worth to 
monetary values is fundamentally flawed and inevitably unsatisfactory. 
 
In recent years, some scholars have responded to this critique by turning their 
attention to institutional (Faber et al, 1996; Sagoff, 1998;  Wilson and Howarth, 2002: 
Jacobs, 1997; Farrell, 2005; 2007; Vatn, 2005), methodological (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1991; Martinez-Alier et al, 1998) and cognitive / epistemological   
(Siebenhuner, 2002: Stagl, 2003; Mayumi and Giampietro, 2006; Sneddona et al, 
2006) aspects of environmental value articulation.  As a constructive response to the 
long standing critique of monetary valuation, this newer approach identifies not only 
the problems at hand but also possible strategies for their resolution.  In the following 
pages it is argued that formal attention to the epistemological problem of construing 
the economic contribution of ecological phenomena could help to advance this 
emerging alternative discourse.   4
 
We can begin by setting out the structure of the problem of ecosystem services 
valuation by reviewing some basic principles.  Next we may review some important 
links between this problem and arguments first presented by Kenneth Boulding and 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen in the 1950s regarding the ecological embeddedness of 
all economic activity and the need to fundamentally revise economic theory in order 
to take this into account.  Finally, based on this review, it will be argued that it is both 
appropriate and necessary for studies of ecosystem services valuation to address, in 
the first instance, epistemological problems associated with construing the wealth 
generating processes that give rise to the economic worth that may or may not be of 
value to one or another economic actor.  Perceiving and articulating the economic 
worth of ecological phenomena requires epistemologically complex environmental 
valuation procedures because multiple ways of knowing simultaneously co-operate in 
the articulation of an ecosystem service’s value.   Drawing here upon Herbert Simon’s 
(1955; 1959) theory of bounded rationality it is possible to describe practices through 
which organisations of people can simultaneously make reference to multiple 
epistemological perspectives concerning the overall economic worth of a given 
object, in this case and ecosystem service.  Here we can imagine a community of 
differently oriented individuals, each offering some information regarding what about 
the service is valuable and to whom.  In the end, there are bound to be overlaps in the 
valuations, which can be balanced as double counts, and there will be gaps.  However, 
there will also be a more or less operational rough picture of the general economic 
contributions of the ecosystem service, which provides not perfect but sufficient 
information upon which to proceed.   
 
The problem of ecosystem services valuation can be understood in terms of some 
basic principles regarding the institutional context in which environmental values are 
articulated; methodological challenges and problems associated with construing 
ecosystem services values; and the role of epistemology in the formulation and 
articulation of environmental values.   
 
Critiques of monetary valuation are well rehearsed and we need not revisit them here.  
Instead, it is proposed here that the method can only ever, at best, refer to demand-
based ecosystem services values, because its only frame of reference is the system of   5
human judgement concerning the economic worth of the phenomenon in question.  
Estimating supply-based ecosystem services requires an approach that can also make 
reference to human systems of judgement concerning how an ecosystem produces 
valuable goods and services.  
 
Here we can define two basics characteristics of supply-based ecosystem service 
values, which make them particularly ill suited for representation through monetary 
valuations: (1) they are fundamentally non-market values, produced according to the 
laws of physics, not the laws of man, this means that their productivity cannot be 
directly regulated through economic controls; and (2) they are components of living 
systems that are fundamentally irreducible, so they cannot be meaningfully 
represented through recourse to single numeric metrics.  Nonetheless, these are 
economically (as opposed to purely ecologically) relevant values, because they 
produce outputs that eventually support economic activities.  In order to capture and 
represent the economic value of these processes and their products, methods of value 
articulation are required that can make reference to data that is organised according to 
the laws of physics and biology, while retaining an analytic that is organised 
according to the principles of economics.  That is to say, two ways of thinking need to 
be applied at the same time to the same problematique. 
 
This presents two fundamental problems for economists: (1) economic worth is 
always specified with respect to what is useful for one or another specific economic 
purpose (GR, 1971: 282).  However, because ecological phenomena are non-
excludable, one phenomenon (a forest, the global climate) may serve many purposes.  
While this is a problem common to all non-excludable goods and services, it is a 
basic attribute of ecological phenomena.  This means that the economic worth of 
these phenomena can only be correctly construed as a complex value. That is to say, 
as a value able to take into account a range of differently oriented economic 
contributions made toward the fulfilment of a range of different economic purposes; 
(2) Although ecological phenomena clearly contribute to economic production, their 
dynamics are regulated by the laws of physics and not by the laws of humans.  This 
means that the economic worth of their contributions includes activities and outputs 
that cannot be described solely through recourse to economic analysis.  The problem   6
here is not simply one of construing the information correctly but also of coping with 
epistemological complexity and uncertainty (sic Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; 1994). 
4.  New Discourses 
Empirically, the economic worth of an ecological phenomenon is always comprised 
of multiple and potentially incommensurable values (O’Neill, 2001; Munda, 1996; 
Smith, 2003), associated with multiple ecosystem functions, which may serve 
different users and different use specifications: i.e. a river might be valuable for its 
beauty, as a clean water supply, as a means for goods transport, as a cooling systems 
for a microclimate with local agricultural value, as nutrient transport for a far away 
delta fishery, etc.   
 
Discussing economic valuation of forest ecosystems, Vatn (2003) points out that 
while ecosystem goods and services clearly have economic values, these are not 
unitary, discrete values.  Instead, ecosystem values are complex, procedural values, 
defined precisely in the context of our interaction with and participation in the 
environment, through, for example, our use of ecosystems “to produce food and 
restructure waste” (Ibid).   
 
If we are to articulate values for these ecosystem goods and services without 
excluding from our description the very attributes we purport to value, then we shall 
require non-reductive valuation procedures that allow us to describe and honour the 
full complexity of these phenomena.  However, honouring such complexity still 
entails making decisions regarding which perspectives count, so to speak, and which 
do not.  This governance question of ‘who decides who decides?’ (Farrell, 2004) has 
been raised, in one form or another by a number of scholars considering the problems 
of environmental valuation, however Luks (2000), Martinez-Alier (2002) and O’Hara 
(1996) each make explicit reference to a set of living systems criteria for deciding this 
that call upon us to formally consider the question of how a society determines who 
has standing to pronounce the economic worth of one or another ecological 
phenomenon.  This proposition, which constitutes the focus of the remainder of this 
paper, fits closely with arguments presented in the early works of Boulding and 
Georgescu-Roegen.  The case for formally considering the question of who decides 
who decides about the criteria for environmental valuation has been well made.  What   7
is still lacking is the development of explicit theoretical explorations concerning what 
new institutional decision making and governance structures might help to make this 
implicit question a topic for regular debate within economic resource management 
and decision-making processes.
v 
4.1.  epistemological complexity / post-normal science intrinsic value   
 
Methodologically, the multiple attributes that contribute to complex ecosystems 
services values are functionally distinct from one and other, are understanding of 
them is based on different descriptive domains (Giampietro, 2004; Giampietro and 
Mayumi, 2001; 2006) and by extension a variety of analytical structures are required 
to measure and evaluate their qualities.  Any associated value articulations will 
necessarily be expressed in language specific to the respective descriptive and 
analytical domains and may well be incommensurable.  While epistemology is 
traditionally understood as the theoretical treatment of ‘truth’ apprehension, this 
definition is dependant upon the presumption that there is only one truth to be 
apprehended.  However, the truth of what ecological phenomena contribute to 
economic processes is complex.  Ecosystem valuation must contend with ‘non-
unitary’ truth.  Developing a single but nonetheless non-reductive picture of the 
economic worth of these phenomena can only be supported by an epistemology that 
can describe the apprehension of complex truth.   
 
Working within the post-normal science discourse Giampietro (2004) uses the 
metaphor of a mosaic to describe how non-reductive descriptions of complex 
problems may be put together, from individual pieces that maintain their 
individuality, while nonetheless contributing to the construction of a bigger picture.  
Similarly, Healy describes what he calls ‘epistemological pluralism’ (Healy, 2003) – 
where multiple incommensurable epistemological perspectives are all deployed to 
contend with a single practical problem.  He proposes that this can lead to the 
discovery of solutions that are beyond the conception of any one single perspective, 
because orientation around a common practical problem provides the coherence that 
is at risk when multiple versions of truth are deemed equally valid. 
4.2.  the role of cognition in value articulation / complex discourse 
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While environmental valuation is intended to provide economic data regarding the 
worth of ecological phenomena, it is nonetheless, a human cognitive activity.   
Whether we are concerned with the stage where economic purpose is defined or with 
the collecting, ordering and analysing of data regarding economic contributions, the 
capacities and limitations of human cognitive faculties are always part of the process 
at hand.  In recent years, the role of cognition and learning in the formulation and 
articulation of values has been discussed by Siebenhuner (2002), Stagl (2003) and 
Hukkinan (2001).  With respect to delimiting and combining different forms of 
information in environmental valuations, Giampietro and Mayumi (2006), Norgaard 
(2004) and Sneddona et al (2006) have all argued that a new view of epistemology, 
which regards truth as multi-dimensional, is required.  What is common across both 
lines of argument is a recognition that the cognitive and perceptual capacities (and 
limitations) of the human brain are factors that should be taken into account when 
describing environmental value articulation processes. 
5.  New Valuation Methods 
As has been pointed out above, the aim of this paper is not to critique monetary 
valuation but to identify new procedures for articulating intrinsic, supply based, 
economic values associated with ecosystem services.  Toward that end, two 
methodological discourses, arising from the theoretical discourses presented above, 
seem to offer a basic theoretical framework from which to begin: deliberative 
valuation and post-normal science extended peer review. 
5.1.  Deliberative valuation 
Use of deliberative consultation as a valuation methodology draws on political theory 
concerning deliberative democracy and typically takes the form of participatory 
stakeholder consultations, such as collaborative modelling and multi-criteria analysis 
(Munda, 2004; DeMarchi et al, 2000; UFZ, 2002; Videira et al, 2003), where 
stakeholders participate in setting the analytical parameters for an economic model or 
deliberative valuation exercises (Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Niemeyer and Spash, 
2001) and groups of individuals discuss and decide contingent monetary values for 
ecological phenomena.  The basic concept is Kantian (1787) in origin and relies on 
the Habermasian theory of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984; 1987; 1996) 
and the ‘ideal speech’ setting, where small groups employ rational discourse, allowing   9
the ‘best argument’ to lead to a consensus.  Common forms of deliberative democracy 
include citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and stakeholder consultation. 
 
O’Hara (1996) offers one of the more concrete explorations of the relationship 
between deliberative democratic theory the problem of complex values, proposing 
that discourse ethics could serve as basis for the kind of complex decision making 
procedures that could include value data from disparate sources.  Dryzek (1987; 1994) 
has also argued that deliberative democracy is particularly useful as an institutional 
setting for the articulation of environmental values, both because it provides a forum 
in which a society of individuals can formulate a shared position on the worth of a 
common good, like an ecosystem, and because this shared position is inherently 
mutable, enabling adaptations in social choice that are responsive to spatial, temporal 
and evolutionary changes in the nature of the ‘common or public good’ at issue.   
 
However, as Stagl (2003) notes, while experiments with public participation may be 
promising in their results they are not yet supported by firm theoretical foundations, 
although work in this direction is certainly underway (Munda, 2004; Kasemir et al, 
2003; Milan Book, 200?).  While the model of deliberative democracy holds promise 
for accommodating epistemologically complex value articulation (see Dryzek, 1987; 
Young, 2000), the arguments justifying the usefulness of the method are currently 
coming under heavy critique within their home discipline of political theory regarding 
its claim to political legitimacy (Dryzek, 2001, O’Neill, 2001, Shapiro, 2003, 
Parkinson, 2003; Smith, 2003; Farrell, 2008; 2010).  While it is certainly not 
necessary for a method of economic valuation to be democratically legitimate, there is 
one aspect of this critique that is, nonetheless, of concern here. 
 
Following Parkinson (2003) we may refer to this as the problem of scope.  It is related 
to difficulties that arise where there are a range of equally valid conflicting views 
regarding a single problem, such that it is not possible to reach an agreement.  In the 
environmental politics discourse it is also referred to as a problem of value conflicts.  
Weale (2001), in evaluating recommendations on the setting of environmental 
standards, which were made by the British Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, argues that if we propose to consider deliberative democracy as a potential 
institutional framework for governance then, “[w]hen theorist of deliberative   10
democracy reject an understanding of democracy in terms of the aggregation of 
interest, they need at least to show how conflicts of value and opinion, as well as of 
legitimate interest, will be dealt with under some alternative regime” (Weale, 
2001:371).  Here there is a need to critically consider the appropriateness of 
mainstream deliberative democracy tools for the task of ecosystem services valuation. 
 
This inadequacy of deliberative democracy theory for managing conflicts, to which 
Weale refers, has been pointed out by many scholars and it is precisely this weakness 
that we find problematic: not on political theory but on epistemological grounds.  The 
basic problem is that deliberative democracy presumes that agreement can be reached 
through deference to the ‘best argument’.  If deliberative democracy is to be used as a 
method for articulating living systems values – which are epistemologically complex 
values – then the concept of ‘best argument,’ which presumes one truth, is 
problematic.  While the presumption that a range of views can all be ‘right’ (Young, 
2000) seems unavoidable, the standard ‘difference democrat’ response to this ‘best 
argument’ form of authority – veto power / the right to reject an argument without 
explaining why – seems an unhelpful alternative where combinations of meanings 
play a central role in building a complex picture of an irreducible whole.
vi 
 
However, somehow, in real life situations, groups of people we do reach decisions 
and make agreements regarding the value of ecosystem services, if only implicitly.  If, 
in the end we are able to agree with others or ourselves, without having resolved our 
personal or collective value conflicts, then there must exist some system of meta-
ordering that can supports this kind of discourse and decision-making.  Here we 
propose that the work of Herbert Simon (YYYY; YYYY), concerning bounded 
rationality, holds out particular promise as a guide for considering how 
epistemologically complex ecosystem services value articulation procedures might be 
designed and operated.  In particular, it provides a clear link between the 
epistemological complexity of the valuation problem and the operational dexterity of 
real economic actors, making complex decisions in complex situations. 
 
The project of putting together the existing discourse on ecosystem services valuation 
with the principles of bounded rationality is a project beyond the scope of this paper.  
Instead, in the final pages here below, a few points of potential links are highlighted,   11
where it seems reasonable to begin the work of weaving these two discourses 
together, to see if they can indeed be used to build a bridge from the ecological 
functions of the biological systems upon and within which human economic activity 
is embedded and the decision-making processes that we use to structure and operate 
these activities. 
5.2.  extended peer review 
In order to articulate the economic worth of a given ecological phenomenon it is 
necessary to understand the dynamics of that phenomenon.  The usefulness of a given 
analysis regarding the ecological functions of a given ecological phenomenon, need to 
be evaluated through reference to what is required in order to conduct good economic 
analysis.  However, the productivity of these same ecological phenomena can only be 
evaluated through reference to ecological analysis referents.  Somehow, the two must 
be combined, not side by side or consecutively but dynamically. Combination of 
multiple epistemological perspectives in such a manner is a task addressed by 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991), through the introduction of the concept of ‘extended 
peer review’.  Extended peer review is a broad concept and we do not propose to 
define it here.  Instead, drawing from Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991; 1993; 1994) and 
Ravetz (1971) we adopt the following working definition: critical evaluation of 
science related problem formulations and scientific analysis by individuals who are 
not expert in the specific field of scientific enquiry being subjected to that critical 
evaluation.  Here there seems to be good potential to use insights from Simon’s work 
to inform the design of rules regarding how groups of discussants are constituted and 
how their contributions are fit together into complex bigger pictures.  Munda (2004) 
has already lead the work in this direction a bit but much more could be done, if the 
theory from Simon were to be engaged as a primary as opposed to instrumental object 
of discussion. 
6.  Enter Simon 
While the introduction of arguments concerning institutions/politics and 
epistemology/cognition into the environmental valuation discourse is relatively 
recent, this approach, which is largely consistent with early ecological economics 
positions presented by Boulding and Georgescu-Roegen is also well in keeping with 
Simon, who was one of the key thinkers opening up the modern discourse on 
institutions and economics.    The need to take institutional factors into account, as   12
empirical data that are relevant for understanding how ecosystem values are construed 
and articulated (O’Neill, 1993;  2001; Vatn, 2005) was raised by Boulding in 1950 
and reiterated by him again in 1991. In concluding his contribution to the first book 
reporting the papers presented at the first ISEE conference (Costanza, 1991) Boulding 
asked “[c]an the human race adapt to the changes that it is producing so rapidly?” 
(Boulding, 1991:25) and encouraged ecological economists to consider the direct 
relationship between his theories of evolutionary economics and the need for careful 
study of “the structure of power in the human race over the future… decisions…[and] 
overall images of the world in the minds of the decision makers, and the learning 
process by which these images are created” (Boulding, 1991:28) including “asking 
what new institutions might be necessary” (ibid:22) if the human race is to 
successfully adapt. 
 
This approach is based on a set of epistemological presumptions that can be traced 
back to specific observations made by Kenneth Boulding (1950; 1981) and Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen (1955; 1971) regarding the structure of ecology related economics 
problems and appropriate ways of construing them.   Their arguments are remarkably 
consistent with more recent contributions which, again, argue that epistemologically 
complex problem definition and decision making procedures are required, if we are to 
even begin the process of discussing the substantive problems associated with 
ecosystem valuation (sic Norgaard, 1989; 2004).  As early as 1955 Georgescu-Roegen 
identified human perspective and political structures as empirically relevant object 
that need to be described and understood if we are to engage with the kinds of 
problems that arise at the interfaces between economic and ecological processes.
vii   
Recalling his return to his home country of Romania in the late 1930s, reflecting on 
his “training in the Western schools with a formidable armamentarium of 
mathematical standard economics”, Georgescu-Roegen found that “Romania’s 
institutions were not adapted to the Walrasian principle of profit maximisation” (GR, 
1976:xi) but “[o]ne certainly would not expect a society that cannot live according to 
the Walrasian distribution theory – i.e., according to the marginal productivity theory 
– to commit suicide rather than adopt another system” (GR, 1966[1955]:339). 
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7.  Conclusions 
Ecosystem biology and complexity theory have both moved on considerably since the 
1950s, revealing some of Boulding’s assertions as naïve (see Levin, 2000) and some 
of Georgescu-Roegen’s views concerning thermodynamics have been demonstrated 
be incomplete and/or incorrect (see Mayumi, 1992; Tsuchida and Murota, 1987).   
Nonetheless, their core presumptions continue to hold salience for economic analysis 
concerning the ecosystem services valuation and point us in a direction that has been 
worked through in forensic detail by Simon, who took these operational problems as 
his main object of study.  Using Simon’s work as a bridge, it may be possible to make 
explicit and operational the epistemological complexity that seems to be limiting 
progress in the design of valuation methods that speak in meaningful ways about the 
supply, as opposed to demand based economic worth of ecosystem services.  In this 
paper the prospect that this might be a useful avenue of enquiry has been considered 
and endorsed.  The work of putting this suggestion into practice seems justified, albeit 
with the caveat that is seems unlikely to be an easy road, through the fruits it may bear 
seem promising. 
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